This paper analyses production and labour market data on manufacturing firms in Ethiopia in
Introduction
The concavity of individual wage rates in labour market experience and job seniority is a well-established empirical regularity. Also well known is the fact that the phenomenon is consistent with a range of competing models of wage determination. On the one hand, we have implicit contract models predicting rising experience and seniority profiles of wages, even against flat profiles of marginal productivity, as a mechanism of income insurance for workers against ability risk (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982) , or the labour market's solution to the problem of moral hazard (Lazear, 1979 (Lazear, , 1981 or adverse selection (Salop and Salop, 1976) . In contrast to these, human capital theory and the hypothesis of job-matching 1 explain rising profiles of wages by JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES, VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1, PP. rising profiles of marginal productivity. According to the theory of human capital, a worker earns more as he gets older because his marginal product increases with time in the labour market as a return to on-the-job investment in general skills (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1962 Mincer, , 1974 Ben Porath, 1967; Heckman, 1976) . Likewise, wages rise with job seniority because marginal productivity grows with time on a job as a return to investment in firm-specific skills (Becker, 1962; Oi, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981) . Moreover, on-the-job general skill formation is financed entirely by the worker by means of earning less than the value of his marginal product for the duration of the investment. The cost of investment in specific skills is shared between the worker and the firm by means of the worker earning more than the value of his marginal product over the duration of investment but giving up a share of the returns thereafter.
Neither of these temporal wedges between earnings and marginal productivity is operational in models of pure job matching. In such models a worker is assumed to earn his spot marginal product, and the growth of marginal productivity with time in the labour market or with job seniority arises simply as a sample selection effect of mobility decisions. As in basic models of human capital theory, uncertainty and information asymmetry are assumed away and job separation is always voluntary and permanent. However, there is no room for onthe-job skill formation since a worker 's intrinsic potential productivity is predetermined in relation to whatever happens following entry into the labour market or upon the assumption of a particular job. What changes during time in the labour market or tenure over a job is not the worker 's skill but the amount of information available to him on his relative marginal productivity in alternative job matches as the basis for mobility decisions. Underlying an observed distribution of individual wage rates is therefore a distribution of the marginal productivity of matches rather than of individuals per se. In a world where jobs are 'pure inspection goods', as is the case in Burdett's (1978) model, mobility decisions are made upon the arrival of information on the productivity of prospective matches. Consequently, the expected marginal product of an older worker must be larger than that of a younger worker in a cross-section on account of his being better matched to his current job, having sampled and rejected a larger number of alternatives. In a contrasting world, where jobs are 'pure experience goods', as is the case in the Jovanovic (1979a) model, mobility decisions are based on new information on the marginal productivity of the current match. Here, a senior worker on a job has a higher expected marginal product than a junior worker because senior workers are less uncertain of the true productivity of their match and, consequently, include fewer poorly matched workers. In an extension of Burdett's model, Topel (1991) proposes one in which, in sharp contrast to the Jovanovic model, mobility biases can create the appearance of marginal productivity and wages falling with job seniority despite the fact that the more productive a job match the more durable it is, as in Jovanovic (1979b) . 2 In this paper, I analyse production and labour market data on a random selection of small-to medium-sized manufacturing firms in Ethiopia in order to answer two complementary questions. First, does a worker 's marginal productivity increase with time in the labour market or with job seniority, as must be the case if on-the-job skill formation or job matching has anything to do with the dynamics of wages as observed in the data? Secondly, assuming that marginal productivity does indeed grow with labour market experience or job seniority, how important is skill formation relative to match effects as a source of growth in productivity? The main feature of the analysis is the joint regression of the log of the average product of hours in a firm and the log of average hourly earnings of its employees on the shares of experience-seniority cells of workers in total annual hours in the firm. Although there is evidence that both marginal product and the wage rate rise with job seniority, the amount by which they do so is very small. However, both do grow substantially with market experience. Taking workers in the 0-5 years experience-seniority cell as the base group, I find that the expected marginal product of a fully mobile worker 3 grows by 65% relative to the base as experience increases from 5 to 10 years. A further 5-year increase in experience raises expected marginal product to more than double that of the base group assuming mobility is maintained. Marginal productivity falls as market experience passes the 15-year mark, but the expected marginal product of a mobile worker with 16 years or more experience is still nearly 80% higher than that of the base group. The between-jobs 2 The empirical framework to be developed in the next section is based on Topel (1991) because of the model's generality in that it generates predictions about the effects of job matching on the experience and seniority profiles of wages and productivity without assuming away skill formation, uncertainty or information asymmetry. 3 By a 'fully mobile worker ' I mean a worker who changes jobs at least once every five years.
growth of hourly wages with potential experience is also large, but not as large as growth in marginal productivity for workers with less than 15 years of experience. This, and the fact that I cannot reject the null that older workers earn their marginal product, is evidence that at least some of the observed growth in wages is a return to general skill formation. However, there is also evidence of significant mobility effects in the same growth. Indeed, individual earning function analysis of data on workers sampled from the same firms and time periods for which the firm level average productivity and average wage equations are estimated indicates that mobility gains are by far the single most important source of the observed between-jobs growth of wages with experience. The ratio of the estimated net mobility gain to between-jobs wage growth due to other sources, including skill formation, is around 1.9 for workers with at most 10 years of potential market experience. This figure is extremely high compared with, for instance, that of around 0.5, which the results of Topel and Ward (1992) imply for US workers of the same age group, and suggests that labour market information has a much higher scarcity value for workers in a country like Ethiopia than for workers in the developed world.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt at simultaneously testing for skill formation and mobility effects in wage growth, not only in a developing country context, but also generally. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes an empirical framework in which the job-matching and skill-formation hypotheses can be tested using firm-level cross-sectional data on workforce characteristics and compensation. Results of the application of the method to the Ethiopian data are presented in Section 3. I conclude with a summary and a brief assessment in Section 4.
Empirical Framework

Inferring Experience and Seniority Profiles from Firm-level Data
In spite of their centrality to theories of pay determination experience or seniority, profiles of employee productivity have so far played only a small role in the empirical testing of hypotheses. The reason for this is that, unlike earnings, the productivity of individuals is impossible to observe. The starting point of this paper is that some of the key implications of basic human capital theory and the hypothesis of job matching to the relationship between earnings and productivity can be tested based on firm-level cross-sectional data on wages, production inputs and the distribution of the workforce by age and job seniority. Suppose we have a population of full-time workers distributed across m firms. We can categorize the workforce of each firm into experience-seniority cells each of which consists of workers falling in an experience interval g = 1, …,G and a job seniority interval h = 1, …, g. Let w be the average wage rate in a firm defined as the total wage-bill of the firm per man-hour. Clearly, w is a weighted average of the mean wage rates, w gh , of all experience cells, with the ratios, P gh , of man-hours of workers of experience level g and seniority level h, to total man-hours as weights. Let λ g = w g1 /w 11 , where w 11 is the average wage rate of workers at experience level 1 and seniority level 1, and let λ gh = w gh /w g1 when 1 < h ≤g so that w gh /w 1 = λ g λ gh . Then
If employers are price takers in the labour market λ g and λ gh must be constant across firms. This leads to the firm level average wage equation:
(1) where α 0 = lnw 11 , η j w is a zero-mean random error term and j = 1, …, m.
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Let y be the value added by an additional hour of work in the firm. This too will be a weighted average of the marginal productivity levels, y gh , of hours of workers in different experience-seniority cells. Denoting δ g ≡ y g1 /y 11 and δ gh = y gh /y g1 when 1 < h ≤ g, we have
The δ g and δ gh s must be constant across price-taking and profitmaximising producers. This leads to the marginal productivity equation
where β 0 = lny 11 and η j y is a zero-mean random error term and j = 1, …, m.
Unlike equation (1), equation (2) is not directly estimable. This is because we cannot observe y j directly. However, the conditional expectation of y j enters the production function of firm j as a quality index of its labour input in a way that makes the parameters δ g and δ gh estimable. Suppose the production function is Cobb-Douglas 5 so that
, where A, γ 1 and γ 2 are constants, Y j is the value added of firm j, K j is the corresponding capital input and L j is the firm's input of quality-adjusted hours. Let H j be the firm's total input of unadjusted hours. I define L j = H j E(y j |P 21j ,P 22j , …, P G1j ,P G2j , …, P GGj ). The average productivity of unadjusted hours, Y j ≡ Y j /H j , in the firm is then given by (3) where γ 0 = lnA + γ 2 β 0 * and ξ j is a random error term including η j y as a component and, hence, generally correlated with η j w but assumed to be orthogonal to all regressors. 6 Tests for skill formation and job-matching effects that will be reported in the next section are based on the joint estimation of equations (1) and (3).
The Cobb-Douglas specification is used in the empirical work to be reported in the next section since it could not be rejected against the translog. It should be noted that the basic arguments and derivations of this section are valid for any flexible functional form and are in no way dependent on the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas function. 6 If the firm's labour input were homogeneous, we would have β0 * = 0 and the experience and seniority profiles of productivity would both be flat, so that δg = 1 and δgh = 1 for all g and h. In this case, E(yj|P21j,P22j, …, PG1j,PG2j, …, PGGj) = 1 and equation (3) would collapse to the usual specification, whereby the conditional expectation of lnYj is simply lnA + γ1ln(Kj/Hj) + (γ1 + γ2 -1)lnH. 7 The derivation of the two equations basically extends the method used by Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) to the case where earnings and productivity potentially depend not only on market experience but also on job seniority.
In interpreting results of such estimation, it is important to bear in mind that α 0 is the log of the expected hourly wage of a worker at the lowest level of market experience and the lowest level of job seniority. The parameter λ g is the expected hourly wage of a worker at the lowest level of seniority and at experience level g relative the base wage e α0 . The parameter λ gh is the expected hourly wage of a worker at experience level g and job seniority level h relative to λ g , where 1 < h ≤ g, which means λ g λ gh , 1 < h ≤ g, is the expected hourly wage of a worker at experience level g and seniority level h relative to the base wage, e α0 .
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The experience and job seniority profiles of relative wages embedded in equation (1) can therefore be usefully be summarised into an experience-seniority 'profile matrix' in which each row describes the job seniority profile of the expected wage rate of a worker at a given level of market experience and a column describes the experience profile of the expected relative wage of a worker at a given level of job seniority:
1.00
The corresponding experience-seniority profile matrix of relative marginal productivity as read from equation (2) is 1.00
To see this, note that we have
Here δ g is the expected marginal product of a worker with the lowest level of seniority at experience level g relative to the expected marginal product of a worker in the base group. The expected marginal productivity of a worker at experience level g and seniority level h relative to a worker with the lowest level of seniority but at the same level of experience is given by δ gh , while δ g δ gh is the same expected marginal product but relative to the expected marginal product of a worker in the base group.
Of particular interest in each of these matrices are the diagonal entries and entries of the first column. The former map out the life cycle growth of the expected relative wage rate or relative marginal product of a non-mobile worker, that is, a worker who has never changed his job after the first k 1 years of time in the labour market, where k 1 is the maximum number years in the labour market of a worker in the base group. The first column describes the life cycle growth of the expected relative wage or relative marginal product of a fully mobile worker, that is, a worker who changes his job at least every k 1 years. As a mapping out of the between-jobs growth of the relative wage rate or relative marginal product with time in the labour market, it isolates the pure effect of market experience on the wage rate or marginal productivity. In contrast, the diagonal of the matrix describes the within-job growth of the relative wage rate or relative marginal product with experience, thereby capturing the sum of the effect of market experience and the effect of job seniority.
where P11 is the proportion of workers in the base group. Assuming that total annual hours, Hj, is fixed, the expected annual wage bill of the firm is
Let Wj11 be the annual wage bill on workers in the base group, Wjg the annual wage bill of workers at experience level g and seniority level one, and Wjgh the annual wage bill on workers at experience level g and seniority level h, with g = 2,3 and
Consequently, the expected hourly wage is e α 0 for workers in the base group, λg e α 0 for workers at experience level g and seniority level one, and λghλg e α 0 for workers at experience level g and seniority level h.
Testing For Skill Formation and Mobility Gains
What kind of restrictions do on-the-job skill formation and job matching impose on the profile matrices of productivity and earnings as set out above? In answering this question, I will use Topel's (1991) model of on-the-job search with skill formation as my conceptual framework. Suppose that the wage rate, w ij , of each individual worker i = 1, …, n working for firm j = 1, …, m is log linear in time in the labour market in years, X 1ij , and job seniority in years, X 2ij . Let α 1 s be the expected return to an additional year in the labour market arising from either on-the-job general skill formation or deferment of compensation for insurance or other reasons. Similarly let α 2 s be the expected return to an additional year on the current job. Assuming further that workers are identical with respect to other observable characteristics, the individual earnings function underlying equation (1) can be written as
where ε ij w is a random error term summing up influences of unobservables. The latter include the effects on earnings of the quality of the job match and of the individual's unmeasured ability. Let these be φ ij w and µ i w respectively and suppose that
where ν ij w are i.i.d., zero-mean error terms orthogonal to experience, job seniority, φ ij w and µ i w . Broadly, the job-matching hypothesis is a set of propositions about the relationship between the effects on earnings of match quality, φ ij w , on the one hand, and X 1ij and X 2ij on the other. The search and match technology of Topel's model is
where u ij φw are zero-mean i.i.d. error terms orthogonal to X 1ij and X 2ij , and a 1 φ and a 2 φ are constants such that
The first of these inequalities states the property of the technology that the current wage of an individual is the maximum offer he has had since joining the labour market, which means that the current match is at least as productive as any of the alternative matches he has inspected to date. The second is the property that mobility occurs only if it pays, so that, if α 2 s > 0, the expected wage/marginal product of movers at their initial jobs is higher than the expected wage/marginal product of stayers. 10 The third inequality is a statement of two propositions, namely, that the more paying or productive a match, the more durable it is, and that the net gain from mobility of movers is positive.
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Topel also assumes that more able workers are less mobile while unobserved ability is uncorrelated across generations of workers 12 so that
where a 2 µ > 0 and u ij µw are zero-mean error terms orthogonal to X 2ij .
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Substituting from (5) and (6) into (4) then gives
In relating equation (7) to equation (1), it is useful to think in terms of a version of it in which X 1ij and X 2ij are replaced by dummies for experience-seniority cells and α 1 and α 2 are replaced by the corresponding intercept-shift parameters. The first step towards this is to let 10 It should be noted that this does not apply if there is no true return to job seniority in terms of wages or productivity. The result also assumes that on-the-job search costs are less than mobility costs (Topel, 1991) . 11 The first of these can be read from equation (5) by rewriting it as
where X1ij 0 ≡ X1ij -X2ij is initial market experience. The second can be read from the same equation by rewriting it as
and where D gij X is the dummy for experience level g and D hij T is the dummy for seniority level h. The second step is to consolidated the dummies for intervals into dummies,
T , of experience-seniority cells in terms of which we can rewrite equation (7).
14 The third step is to take the sample mean of the resulting equation on the basis of which it can be shown that 15 (9)
In light of equation (8), α 1g measures the expected earnings of a fully mobile worker at experience level g and we have
where a 1g φ > 0, g = 2, …, G, is a gain from mobility and α 1g s is the return to experience. The expected experience and seniority premium of a non-mobile worker at experience level g is given by α 1g + α 2g , which cannot include a mobility gain but does include a true experience effect, α 1g s , a true seniority effect, α 2g s , a match quality effect, a 2g φ , and an unobservable ability effect, a 2g µ , so that I have used here the approximation expx ≈ 1 + x. This is merely for convenience of notation and has no bearing on the conclusions of this section. More importantly, it is the exact relations that are used in the estimation and inference reported in the next section. These are λg = expα1g, λgh = expα2h and λgλgh = exp(α1g + α2h), which, for the case of G = 2, for example, are obtained from
where α0 = lnw11, (α0 + α12) = lnw12 and α0 + α12 + α22 = lnw22.
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(11)
Consider next the expected experience and seniority premium of a worker at experience level g but in an intermediate state of mobility, i.e., at seniority level h such that 1 < h < g. This is given by α 1g + α gh and must have the same components as the expected premium of a non-mobile worker except that, like the expected premium of a fully mobile worker, it includes a mobility gain, a 1g φh . Hence,
Neither Topel's model nor basic models of job matching or skill formation make explicit use of the concept of a productivity equation. The concept is nonetheless implicit in the same models in as far as it is assumed either that workers earn their marginal product or that movement in marginal productivity mimics that of earnings. I therefore assume that the earnings equation (7) corresponds to the individual workers productivity function (13) lny ij = X 1ij β 1 + X 2ij β 2 + η ij y I also assume that the error term η ij y and the constants β 1 and β 2 have components due to skill formation, job matching or unobserved individual heterogeneity, defined in strict analogy to η ij w , α 1 and α 2 , respectively, so that
Corresponding to the set of relations in (9) are (14) δ g = 1 + β 1g
where
As is the case with the corresponding parameters of the earnings function, we should have b 1 φ > 0 and b 2 φ < 0, but b 1 φ + b 2 φ > 0 under Topel's search-and-match technology. 16 Testing for General Skill Formation A rising experience profile of wages means that λ g increases with g, at least initially. According to existing theory, this is indicative of one or more of three things, namely, on-the-job general skill formation, match improvement and deferment of compensation as an insurance, screening or disciplining device.
17 However, while current theories of deferred compensation are compatible with a rising profile of relative marginal productivity, they do not predict the phenomenon. Both the job-matching hypothesis and the theory of human capital do. The observation that both λ g and δ g increase with g at least initially is therefore evidence that not all the observed between-jobs growth can be attributed entirely to deferment of compensation.
18 Assuming that we do have evidence for skill formation or job matching in this sense, the question then arises of whether we can exclude the possibility that the observed between-jobs growth in productivity is entirely a jobmatching effect. The null that all the observed between-jobs growth of 16 However, the scope of interpretation of β1 s and β2 s should be narrower than that of α1 s and α2 s , respectively. As already noted, the observation that α1 s > 0 or that α2 s > 0 can be the outcome of skill formation or deferment of compensation. On the other hand, while being the main prediction of models of on-the-job skill formation or of job matching, the observation that β1 s > 0 or that β2 s > 0 cannot be the outcome of deferment of compensation. This distinction between the two sets of theories is the basis for the tests reported in this paper. 17 While λg and δg, respectively, are the expected relative wage and expected relative marginal product of a worker at experience level g, we have λg < δg only if the expected absolute wage of the worker is less than his expected absolute marginal product. Likewise, λg = δg only if the expected absolute wage is equal to the expected absolute marginal product. To see this, we need only note that the expected wage and the expected marginal product of a worker in the base group are e α 0 and e β 0 respectively. The expected wage rate of a worker at experience level g and seniority level one is e α 0 +α 1g , while the expected marginal product of the same worker is e β 0 +β 1g . Since the definitions of λg and δg are λg = (e α 0 +α 1g /e α 0 ) and δg = (e β 0 +β 1g /e β 0 ), we have (δg/λg) = e β 1g -α 1g , that is, λg < δg only if β1gα1g. 18 The observation that both λg and δg increase with g is not, of course, evidence against deferment of compensation, which is as consistent with a rising profile of marginal productivity as it is with a flat one. A the same time, while failure to reject a flat age or seniority profile of marginal productivity would count as evidence against the hypotheses of job matching and skill formation, it cannot be regarded as evidence for or against deferment of compensation. productivity is a mobility gain can be tested by comparing the estimated experience profile of relative marginal productivity with that of the relative wage since on-the-job searching or matching cannot, on its own, create a discrepancy between spot wage and spot marginal productivity while the general skill formation hypothesis does. Specifically, we reject the same null if we observe that λ g < δ g in the rising phase of the profile of marginal productivity, but λ g = δ g eventually as this would be consistent with the implication of human capital theory that on-the-job investment in general skills is wholly financed by the worker.
Testing For Mobility Gains
Assume next that we have observed that both λ g and δ g rise, at least initially, and that λ g < δ g in the rising phase of the experience profile of marginal productivity. This will leave us with the other extreme possibility open, namely, that there are no productivity gains from mobility, so that the observed between-jobs growth in productivity should be attributed entirely to skill formation. One way of testing this as a null is to compare the expected relative marginal product of a fully mobile worker with that of a less mobile worker with the same level of market experience, that is, to compare δ g with δ g δ gh , where 1 < h < g. There is a positive mobility gain in the data if and only if the expected productivity of a fully mobile worker is higher than that of a less mobile but otherwise identical worker. This in turn is possible only if δ g > δ g δ gh . This follows from (14), which implies that
Testing For Specific Skill Formation
If the mobility gain b 1g φ is positive, so that δ g δ gh < δ g , we must also have δ gh < 1, that is, the expected marginal product of a worker at experience level g and job seniority level, h < g, must be less than the marginal product, δ g , of a newly matched worker at the same level of market experience.
This does not, of course, mean that the net return to job seniority is negative since (15)
It rather means that, irrespective of whether or not indivdual's differ in unmeasured ability, δ gh understates the true return, β gh s , to seniority if there are positive gains from mobility. This follows because
Notice also that, as h increases, b g φh drops to zero so that cannot decrease with h, this in turn means that δ gg > δ gh . In other words, we have 1 > δ g2 < δ gh ≤ δ gg for all h: 2 < h < g so that the series 1,δ g2 , …, δ gh , …, δ gg , as read from the profile matrix of productivity, maps out a U-shape. The series 1,λ g2 , …, λ gh , …, λ gg should trace a U-shape since λ g ,λ gh and λ gg have components analogous to δ g ,δ gh and δ gg , respectively. 20 Given that both job seniority profiles are U-shaped, the null that β 2g s = 0 so that specific skill formation has nothing to do with the observation that δ gg > δ gh should be rejected if we observe λ gh > δ gh in the rising phase of seniority profile of marginal productivity and λ gh < δ gh thereafter, since this pattern is indicative of the sharing of the cost of specific skill formation by the firm and the worker, as is the prediction of the specific capital hypothesis.
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Measuring the Relative Magnitudes of Skill Formation and Mobility Effects
The joint estimation of equations (1) and (3) thus enables us to test for both skill formation and mobility effects, even in a single cross-section of observations. However, we need to estimate the equations in first difference or error component versions if we are to proceed beyond this and obtain an estimate of the magnitude of either effect. Unfortunately, the sample size of firms per time period is too small for this route to be pursued in this study. Instead I have taken advantage of the availability of a three-year panel of observations on earnings and related characteristics of workers randomly sampled from the firms for which equations (1) and (3) have been estimated. An earnings function analysis of this additional piece of information is useful in two ways. First, it provides a conventional benchmark against which results of estimation of firm level average productivity and average wage rate equations can be viewed. Secondly, it can give us some idea of the magnitude of mobility effects relative to the effect of skill formation, if and when the existence of both is established by the analysis of firm level productivity and wage data. To see this, suppose equation (4) applies to longitudinal observations so that we should in fact write:
and distributional assumptions about error components are as stated before. Topel (1991) has proposed a two-step instrumental variable (IV) procedure for obtaining a consistent estimate of a lower bound for the true effect, α 2 s , of job seniority on wages using data on within-job growth of earnings. The first step of the procedure is the application of ordinary least squares (OLS) to the first difference of equation (17), which results in a consistent estimate, A ≡ α 1 s + α 2 s , of α 1 s + α 2 s . The second step consists in obtaining IV estimates, α 1 IV and α 2 IV , of α 1 s and α 2 s , respectively, by applying least squares to
with X 1 as an instrument for X 1 0 in the estimation of each equation. 22 It can be shown that (19) where γ 12 is the coefficient of the regression of X 2 on X 1 . I will exploit two features of Topel's procedure for the purpose at hand. First, the procedure consistently estimates the net mobility gain parameter a 1 φ + a 2 φ . Secondly, although α 1 IV and α 2 IV are biased for their respective parameters, α 1 IV is biased up for α 1 s exactly by the same amount that α 2 IV is biased down for α 2 s . For given values of α 1 IV and α 2 IV we can calculate λ g IV , λ gg IV and λ g IV λ gg IV as our estimates of λ g , λ gg and λ g λ gg , respectively, which, in view of equation (19), have the properties The terms e1 and e2 are random errors respectively given by ε w + X2(A -A) and ε w + X1 (A -A) , where A = a1 φ + a2 φ .〉 instead of α 1 IV we can also calculate an alternative estimator, λ g , of λ g with the property that
IV is consistent for the sum of the true return to market experience and the true return to job seniority. Hence it is consistent for an upper bound of the true return to market experience. It is also clear that (λ g IV -λ g )/(γ 12 /1 -γ 12 ) is consistent for a 1g φ + a 2g φ . Consequently, the ratio of (λ g IV -λ g )/(γ 12 /1 -γ 12 ) to λ g IV λ gg IV -1 is consistent for the ratio of net mobility gains, a 1g φ + a 2g φ , to the sum of the true returns to experience and job seniority, α 1g s + α 2g s and, hence, for a lower bound of the ratio of net mobility gains to the return to general skill formation in the between-jobs growth of wages.
Data and Results
Data
The paper is based on the 1993 and 1995 waves of the Addis Ababa Industrial Enterprise Survey. The 1993 wave of the survey covered a random selection of 220 manufacturing establishments in the Addis Ababa region of Ethiopia, of which 30 were public enterprises. The 1995 wave revisited all the public enterprises and 164 of privately owned firms surveyed in the 1993 wave, and an additional 26 private firms as replacements for those which had exited the sample in 1995. Each wave involved the administration of a written questionnaire to enterprise managers in several modules and a separate labour market module to a random selection of workers from each firm. The data analysed here were drawn from returns to the production and labour market modules of the questionnaire to managers in both waves, and the labour market questionnaire to workers in the 1995 wave. Equations (1) and (3) were estimated on the basis of 345 observations on privately owned establishments pooled from the two waves. A firm was included in this sample only if it met two criteria, namely, that it was privately owned and that complete observations on the firm were available from the 1995 wave. This meant that a 1993 observation was included in the pool only if it was complete and related to a privatelỹ
owned firm on which complete observations were available from the 1995 wave. Public enterprises were excluded from the sample analysed here because public sector jobs in Ethiopia are rationed, and there is an apparent difference in the job-matching process between the public and private sectors. Earnings function estimates are based on observations on 1448 of the workers covered by the 1995 wave. The sample selection criterion used here was that an observation related only to a worker who had been continuously employed for at least 3 years by 1995 in a firm belonging to the sample used to estimate equations (1) and (3). The requirement of a minimum of 3 years continuous employment on the same job is the only way of ensuring that earnings function estimates are not contaminated by earnings data from past employment in firms outside of the sample used to estimate the productivity and wage equations.
For the purpose of estimation, equation (3) has been augmented to include dummy variables as controls for variation in year of observation, composition of workforce by level of schooling, gender composition of the workforce, employment size of the firm, age of the firm, average age of equipment, main method of production and industry. With the exception of those relating to the age of the firm and the average age of its equipment, the same dummy variables also figure in the estimated version of equation (1). Definitions of these and basic variables of the two equations are given in Table 1 along with descriptive statistics. Output, wage and capital stock figures for 1993 observations were all expressed at 1995 prices using the Addis Ababa Retail Price Index before pooling observations across the two waves of the survey. Output is defined as annual production less the value of intermediate inputs and utility charges. The corresponding annual capital input is proxied by the estimated current sales value of equipment at 1995 prices. Time in the labour market or potential experience is measured as age expressed to the nearest year minus years of schooling minus six. Job seniority is measured as the nearest full number of continuous years of employment in the current firm. Experience-seniority cells of the workforce of a firm are defined in terms of four levels or year intervals, namely, 5 years or less, 6-10 years, 11-15 years and 16 years or over. The base cell consists of workers with 5 years or less of potential market experience. The share of an experience-seniority cell of workers in the annual input of labour in a firm is defined as the ratio of annual hours of workers in the cell to total annual hours of all workers in the firm. Descriptive statistics for shares of individual cells are given in Table 2 . Table 3 gives descriptive statistics and definitions of variables used in the estimation of earnings functions. Earnings function estimates in levels refer to 1994 and 1995 observations for workers employed continuously in the current firm for at least the past 3 years. Earnings function estimates in first difference are based on the difference between 1995 hourly wages for the same workers and their 1994 hourly wages, the latter having first been expressed at 1995 prices. The control dummies used in the estimation of earning functions in levels relate to schooling, gender, industry and employment size.
Results
Profile Matrices of Relative Marginal Productivity and Relative Wages
Nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates of the firmlevel average productivity and wage rate equations are reported in Table 4 based on the assumption that E(η j w ξ j ) = σ ηξ is constant across firms, as are the variances of η j w and ξ. The productivity equation is estimated based on the Cobb-Douglas specification. Parameters of the relative marginal productivity equation can be derived and estimated for any flexible specification of the production function of the firm, including the translog. However, based on the estimation of the equivalent of equation (3) under the translog specification, a Wald test could not reject the Cobb-Douglas restrictions at a reasonable level of significance (P-value = 0.4214). Estimates of coefficients of control variables, namely, year of observation, schooling, industry, firm size, firm age, average age of equipment and mode of production, are not reported. In Tables 5 and 6 , I report the experience-seniority profile matrices of relative marginal productivity and relative wages as read from Table 6 . P-values of Wald tests of within-and cross-equation restrictions of interest relating to the profiles of marginal productivity and wages are reported in Table 7 . In Table 5 , each element is an estimate of the expected wage rate of a worker of a given level of market experience and a given level of job seniority relative to the expected wage rate of a worker in the base group, that is, a worker for whom market experience is 5 years at most. The corresponding entry in Table 6 estimates the expected marginal product of a worker in the same experience-seniority group relative to the expected marginal product of a worker in the base group. In either table, a column shows how the expected relative marginal product or relative wage changes as market experience rises from one 5-year level to the next assuming that job seniority is always fixed at some 5-year level. A row describes how the expected relative marginal product or the expected relative wage changes as job seniority increases from one 5-year level to the next but, this time, assuming that market experience Flat experience profile of the wage rate, i.e., λ g = 1, g = 2, 3, 4 0.02247 Flat experience profile of marginal product, i.e., δ g = 1, g = 2, 3, 4 0.00011 Identical experience and seniority profiles of marginal product and the wage rate, i.e., λ g = δ g , g = 2, 3, 4 0.00362
Flat job seniority profiles of the wage rate, i.e., λ gh = 1, 2 ≤ h ≤ g, g = 2, 3, 4 0.85735
Flat job seniority profiles of marginal product, i.e., δ gh = 1, 2 ≤ h ≤ g, g = 2, 3, 4 0.00001
Identical job seniority profiles of marginal product and the wage rate, λ gh = δ gh , h ≤ g, g = 2, 3, 4 0.08357
Flat experience and seniority profile of the wage rate, i.e., λ g λ gh = 1, 2 ≤ h ≤ g, g = 2, 3, 4 0.03679
Flat experience and seniority profile of marginal product, i.e., δ g δ gh = 1, 2 ≤ h ≤ g, g = 2, 3, 4 0.05499
Equality of relative wages and relative marginal product, i.e., λ g λ gh = δ g δ gh 0.03011 is fixed at some 5-year level. The first column maps out the estimated between-jobs experience profile of expected relative marginal productivity or wages for a fully mobile worker, that is, a worker who changes jobs at least once every 5 years. Diagonal elements estimate the corresponding within-job growth since they refer to a non-mobile worker, i.e., a worker who has never changed his job since his first 5 years in the labour market. Off-diagonal elements other than those in the first column estimate the expected relative marginal product or wage of a worker in an intermediate state of mobility, that is, a worker who does change jobs but less frequently than at least once every 5 years. It is clear from Table 5 that there is substantial between-jobs growth in wages as market experience increases and the null of a flat experience profile of wages is rejected for fully mobile workers (Table  7) . For instance, the expected wage rate of a fully mobile worker with 11-15 years of market experience is 35% higher than the expected rate of a worker in the base group, while the expected wage rate of a worker with a minimum of 16 years of experience is 75% higher than the base. Evidence that at least a part of this growth in wages with experience is the return to on-the-job skill formation or match improvement through mobility is provided by the first column of Table 6 , from which we read that the expected relative marginal product of a fully mobile worker also grows with experience, albeit at a decreasing rate. The null of a flat experience profile of marginal productivity is also rejected for such a worker even more easily than the null that the experience profile of his wage rate is flat (Table 7) . Notice also that marginal productivity grows faster than the wage rate for a fully mobile worker. Thus, as market experience increases from 5 to 10 years, expected marginal productivity grows to 65% higher than the base. A further 5-year increase in experience more than doubles expected marginal productivity relative to the base. Marginal productivity falls as experience increases from then onwards. However, the expected marginal product of a fully mobile worker with at least 16 years of market experience is still nearly 80% higher than the base. It is not surprising, therefore, that the null that the experience profile of marginal product is identical to the corresponding wage profile is easily rejected for a fully mobile worker (Table 7 ). This is evidence that at least some of the observed between-jobs growth in marginal productivity is the return to general skill formation, since the test outcome is primarily a consequence of a worker with 15 years or less of experience being paid less than the marginal product while there is no evidence that δ g is different from λ g for older workers. On the other hand, the null that mobility gains have nothing to do with the observed between-jobs growth in marginal productivity is also rejected. Estimates of δ 32 , δ 42 and δ 43 are all significantly less than unity (Table 4) as a result of which the estimate of δ 3 δ 32 is significantly smaller than that of δ 3 while estimates of δ 4 δ 42 and δ 4 δ 43 are both significantly smaller than that of δ 4 (Table 6 ). The overall conclusion to be drawn from the estimated experience profiles of marginal productivity and wages for a fully mobile worker is then two-fold. First, there is evidence that at least a part of the observed between-jobs growth of wages is due to between-jobs growth in marginal productivity and, hence, must be regarded as the result of match improvement or return to on-the-job skill formation. Secondly, the observed between-jobs growth in marginal productivity is in part due to on-the-job skill formation and in part reflects the improvement match through mobility.
The fact that δ gh < 1 whenever h < g, as estimates in Table 4 indicate, means that job-matching effects are a significant influence in the job seniority profile of marginal productivity. However, such effects are by no means the only determinant of the profile. As can be seen from the same table, the null δ gg = 1 cannot be rejected for any value of g. However, the estimated job seniority profile of marginal productivity is rising at each level of experience from seniority level two onwards, that is, the estimate of δ gh increases with h provided h ≥ 2. Since job-matching effects do not increase with seniority, this can only be evidence that more senior workers have a greater endowment either of firm-specific capital or of unobserved ability. In principle, the rise in the job seniority profile of marginal productivity may have nothing to do with specific skill formation. However, two observations suggest otherwise. First, although the null of a flat job seniority profile of the relative wage cannot be rejected (Table 7) , the estimated profile follows the same U-shape as the seniority profile of relative marginal productivity. Secondly, the null that the two profiles are identical is rejected (Table 7) essentially because δ gh < λ gh whenever h < g for g, h ≥ 2, which is consistent with the financing implications of the specific skill formation hypothesis.
The Earnings Function Evidence
The picture emerging from the results of the estimation of the experience-seniority profiles of relative marginal productivity and the relative wage is thus one in which both on-the-job skill formation and job-matching are significant sources of the growth of wages with market experience and job seniority. In Tables 8-10, I present results of the analysis of individual level earnings data with the aim of forming some idea of the magnitude of job-matching effects relative to returns to skill formation in the observed between-jobs growth of marginal productivity. OLS parameter estimates of alternative specifications of the earnings function as a quadratic and as a quartic are given in Table 8 . The standard quadratic specification is rejected at the 5% level in favour of the quartic, which is regarded as being superior to the quadratic in that it largely eliminates the tendency of the quadratic to understate earnings growth for younger workers while overstating it for those in the middle age group (Murphy and Welch, 1990) . 23 Results of the first step of Topel's two-step IV estimator, as reported in Table 9 , are therefore based on the quartic specification. A comparison of the main 'effects' of experience and job seniority, as read from the same table, with the corresponding OLS parameter estimates of the quartic specification in Table 8 shows that the latter are very much biased towards the true return to seniority as a result of the correlation of unobserved ability with job tenure. By removing this bias the specification underlying Table 9 brings the estimate of α 1 s + α 2 s for new labour market entrants from nearly 13% a year to just over 8% per year.
Results of the second step of Topel's procedure are reported in Table  10 . The first column of this table is the constant term of the specification estimated in Table 9 . The second and third column are estimates of the coefficients of X 1ij 0 and -X 1ij 0 obtained by applying least squares to the first and second equations, respectively, of (18) extended to the case of a full quartic specification and to include the usual control variables of schooling, gender, industry and employer size. 24 The fourth column is the estimate of the coefficient of X 2 in the estimation of the extended form of the first equation of (18). The first column entry tells us that, once we remove mobility gains and returns to unobserved ability, the hourly wage of a new entrant to the labour market will grow on average by just 8% during the first year as the sum of the true returns to market experience and job seniority. The entry of the third column then tells us that at least 15% of this within-job growth in wages is return to job seniority, leaving the balance as the maximum possible annual return to market experience. This is consistent with the evidence, reported in preceding sections, in favour of specific skill formation being a source of within-job wage growth. However, the magnitude of the estimate also suggests that the true return to job seniority in general, and, hence, the return to specific skill formation in particular, may well account for a very small fraction of the observed within-job wage growth. 
where Z is a vector of control variables, γis the vector of coefficients of the same,
and Γ is the vector of coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 . Likewise, in place of the second equation of (18), I estimate
where χ2 has the same elements as χ1 with the exception of its first element, which is X2. In either case, X1 0 is instrumented by X1.3
The entry of the last column of Table 10 consistently estimates the net gain to mobility, a 1 φ + a 2 φ , at the end of the first year. It tells us that the hourly wage of a new entrant to the labour market would grow on average by 3.6% at the end of the first year purely as a result of match improvement through mobility, i.e., as return to the growth in the information available to the worker regarding prospective job matches. This is a very high figure compared with the estimate of the sum of the true returns to experience and job seniority for a non-mobile worker, as reported in the first column of the table. Indeed, the ratio of net mobility gain to the sum of the true returns to experience and seniority grows dramatically beyond the first 5 years of time in the labour market to a point where mobility gains are the dominant source of between-jobs wage growth. This is what is shown in Table 11 . In the first and second columns of this table, I have used the values of α 1 IV and α 2 IV , as reported in Table 10 , and estimates of coefficients of changes in second and higher powers of X 1 and X 2 , as reported in Table 9 , to calculate λ g IV and λ g IV λ gg IV . The base wage relative to which these measure between-jobs and within-job growth at experience level g is the hourly wage of a worker at 2.75 years of time in the labour market and 2.75 years of time on the current job, 2.75 being the midpoint of the base interval of 0-5.5 years. 25 Values of λ g are reported in the third column of Table 11 . Entries in the fourth column of the table are estimates of net mobility gains at experience level g, obtained by subtracting entries in the third column from the corresponding entries in the first column and dividing by 0.7065, which the estimated value of γ 12 /(1 -γ 12 ). In the last column I express entries of the fourth column as ratios of λ g IV λ gg IV -1. As pointed out earlier, each ratio consistently estimates a lower bound to the magnitude of net mobility gains to the return to skill formation at a given level of experience level g. The figures range from 1.89 for workers in the experience range of 5-10 years to 3.53 for workers in the experience range of 10-15 years. Thus, while estimates of the firm level average productivity and wage equations show that both mobility gains and general skill formation are significant influences in the between-jobs growth of wages and 25 Since λg IV is biased towards the expected relative wage, it is not surprising that figures in the first column of the table are much higher than the corresponding entries in Table 5 . It is not surprising either that figures of the second column ot the table are much lower than the corresponding figures for within-job growth as given in Table 5 , since the latter are biased towards the sum of the true returns to experience and seniority while λg IV λgg IV is not.^^^S kill Formation, Job Matching and Wage Growth 31 productivity, the earning function evidence is that mobility gains are by far the more important of the two sources.
Summary and Conclusion
In what I believe is the first attempt at simultaneous testing of the skill formation and job-matching hypotheses of wage growth, this paper has analysed production and labour market data from a random selection of small-and medium-sized manufacturing firms in Ethiopia. The key step in the analysis is the joint regression of the log of the average productivity of hours in the firm and the log of the average hourly earnings of its employees on the relative shares of experience-seniority categories of the workforce in total hours in the firm. The value of this as a technique is that it generates experience-seniority profile matrices of marginal productivity and wages on which the skill formation and job-matching hypotheses impose well-known restrictions. According to the test result reported in the paper, both skill formation and job matching produce significant between-jobs growth of marginal productivity with market experience, which must account for at least part of the observed between-jobs growth of wages with experience. However, an earnings function analysis of data on workers sampled from the firms and period for which the productivity and wage profile matrices were estimated leads to the conclusion that job matching is by far the more important of the two sources: net mobility gains account for at least twice the share of the return to skill formation in the observed between-jobs growth of wages with market experience. This figure is extremely high compared with the figure of 0.5 reported by Topel and Ward (1992) for US workers with 10 years or less of time in the labour market, and even higher than those suggested for US workers in the same age group by Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Bartel and Borjas (1981) . Although the rate of return to formation is much higher for US workers than workers in Ethiopia, the US rate of return to skill formation as reported, for example, by Topel (1991) is at most 50% higher than the figures I calculate for my sample of workers. The higher ratio of mobility gains to the return to skill formation for Ethiopia suggests that labour market information may have a much higher scarcity value for workers in Ethiopia.
Tests of the skill formation hypothesis have to date been overwhelmingly dominated by earnings function analysis (e.g., Haley, 1976; Lillard and Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980; Neumark and Taubman, 1995; Baker, 1997) , as have been those of the job-matching hypothesis (e.g. Flinn, 1986; Altonji and Shakoto, 1987; Marshal and Zarkin, 1987; Abraham and Farber, 1987; Garen, 1989; Topel, 1988 Topel, , 1991 Topel and Ward, 1992) . Indeed, I am aware only of three studies in which data on workers' productivity are directly analysed in testing models of wage determination: Medoff and Abraham (1980) , Blackmore and Hoffman (1989) and Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) . The Medoff and Abraham study compared employee earnings in two large US manufacturing corporations with supervisors' performance evaluation data, and concluded that on-the-job skill formation could not explain 'a substantial part of the observed return to labour market experience'. In spite of the acknowledged limitation of performance evaluation scores as a proxy for productivity, this result remains the only direct evidence in favour of alternatives to the human capital explanation of a rising experience profile of earnings. The study by Blackmore and Hoffman went beyond the case study scope of the Meddof and Abraham paper in analysing aggregate time series productivity and earnings data on the US manufacturing sector as a whole. However, it was concerned exclusively with the influence of job seniority on productivity and wages. Its results were therefore not comparable with those of the Medoff and Abraham paper. The Hellerstein and Neumark paper was a significant step forward in terms of direct use of observations on productivity by using firm-level data and was, indeed, the first attempt at the joint estimation of marginal productivity and wage profiles as the basis for testing the skill formation hypothesis. Unfortunately the authors focused on age profiles to the exclusion of job seniority profiles without which job-matching effects could not be tested for. 26 The methodological contribution of this paper is to extend the Hellerstein and Neumark specification into a framework in which one can simultaneously test for both skill formation and job matching in cross-sectional data.
